On November 9, 2020, Washington Court of Appeals, Division I, released its unpublished opinion in Duranzan v. Seattle Housing and Resource Effort. More details after the jump break.
Seattle Housing and Resource Effort (SHARE) is a nonprofit homeless shelter which provides low-income housing in exchange for the occupant's work, basically a housing-for-work arrangement. Occupants pay monthly utility copayments.
SHARE terminated the employment of Duranzan and three other occupants (collectively "residents"), and the residents refused to leave. The residents sued to prevent their eviction. The trial court consolidated the cases.
On three occasions, SHARE asked the court to dismiss the cases on summary judgment. The first time, the court denied the motion but allowed SHARE to bring an ejectment claim "as long as the legal basis is something other than one of the exemptions under RCW 59.18.040 that was (previously) argued."
On attempt #2, which may have included arguments for ejectment and unjust enrichment, the court ruled that the residents were tenants-at-will and not subject to Seattle's Just Cause Eviction Ordinance. The court denied any request based on unjust enrichment.
On the third summary judgment motion, the court finally ruled in SHARE's favor. Duranzan's court-appointed attorney had asked to withdraw from the case before the third SJ hearing and was permitted to withdraw after the hearing. Duranzan appealed.
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Division I affirmed the trial court's ruling to eject Duranzan.
First, Division I cited Turner v. White to confirm Duranzan was a tenant-at-will. Duranzan was not required to pay traditional monthly rent, was allowed to be on the premises pursuant to a housing-for-work arrangement, and said occupancy at SHARE's duplex was terminable without notice. Division I then strictly interpreted RCW 59.18.030(28) to hold that a utility copayment, by itself, is NOT rent.
Second, the appellate court rejected Duranzan's claims that SHARE unlawfully retaliated against him for alleged prior complaints.
Third, Duranzan did not properly challenge SHARE's argument that Duranzan's employment termination also terminated his right to stay at the premises. Under SMC 22.206.160(C)(1)(g), SHARE presented just cause to remove Duranzan from the premises. Duranzan seemingly disagreed in his filed paperwork, but did not present any legal authorities to support his position. Thus, the court had to rule for SHARE.
Finally, the court rejected Duranzan's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
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It appears SHARE's attorneys and the courts knew not to go the traditional unlawful detainer route, since the appellate opinion discusses Duranzan's "ejectment", instead of eviction. RCW 59.18.040(8) is an exemption to the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act when an employee occupies the landlord's property and the right to occupy is conditioned on the employee's employment "in or about" the premises. Since this was an ejectment, Duranzan and his attorney could not use this counterargument.
To me, this is a potentially notable case to clarify what might be considered rent and who may be considered a tenant-at-will. My recollection of Turner is a bit hazy, but if there were truly no monetary payments of ANY type in that case, and the only consideration the occupant gave was work services, that's arguably different from Duranzan, who paid a monthly monetary sum towards utilities in addition to his physical work obligations.
The July 2019 amendments to the RLTA did not impact Division I's citing of RCW 59.18.030(28). This case may have been filed with the trial court prior to those amendments taking effect, and the added language referencing 59.18.283 is inapplicable to this matter.
The appellate court's strict interpretation of RCW 59.18.030(28) could be useful to a future litigant if allowed to be cited as controlling authority. I believe there are more employment arrangements that fit the mold of Duranzan than people may realize.
